Recent Advances and Future Challenges in Risk-Based Radiation Engineering by Pellish, Jonathan A.
Recent Advances and Future Challenges 
in Risk-Based Radiation Engineering
Jonathan A. Pellish
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center
Greenbelt, MD USA
October 2016
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
This work was sponsored in part by the NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) program
and the NASA Engineering & Safety Center (NESC).
Deliverable to NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program to be published on nepp.nasa.gov.
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20160013227 2019-08-29T17:28:03+00:00Z
Acknowledgements
• NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) 
program
• NASA Engineering & Safety Center (NESC)
• Ray Ladbury, NASA/GSFC
• Mike Xapsos, NASA/GSFC
Deliverable to NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program to be published on nepp.nasa.gov. 2
Overview
• Introduction to hardness 
assurance (HA).
o From a robotic space system 
perspective, starting at the 
piece-part level.
• Systematic and statistical 
issues inherent to HA.
o We are risk-averse.
• Moving towards risk-tolerant 
system design approaches.
• Future challenges.
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Credit: Solar Dynamics Observatory, NASA
Introduction
• HA defines the methods used to assure that 
microelectronic piece-parts meet specified requirements 
for system operation at specified radiation levels for a 
given probability of survival (Ps) and level of confidence
(C).
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Overview of the radiation hardness assurance process
C. Poivey, IEEE NSREC Short Course, “Radiation Hardness Assurance for Space Systems,” Phoenix, July 2002.
R. Pease, IEEE NSREC Short Course, “Microelectronic Piece Part Radiation 
Hardness Assurance for Space Systems,” Atlanta, July 2004.
Radiation Design Margin
controls process
Additional HA Details
• HA applies to both single-particle and cumulative 
degradation mechanisms.
o Total ionizing dose (TID),
o Total non-ionizing dose (TNID) / displacement damage 
dose (DDD), and
o Single-event effects (SEE) – both destructive and non-
destructive.
• Historically, HA is controlled by radiation design 
margin (RDM) – particularly for TID and TNID.
o RDM is defined as the ratio of the mean part failure level to 
the radiation specification level derived from the 
environment.  We will return to RDM.
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RDM = 𝑅𝑅mf
𝑅𝑅spec
System Level HA
• Always faced with conflicting demands between “Just 
Make It Work” (designer) and “Just Make It Cheap” 
(program).
• Many system-level strategies pre-date the space age 
(e.g., communications, fault-tolerant computing, etc.).
• Tiered approach to validation of mission requirements.
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R. Ladbury, IEEE NSREC Short Course, “Radiation Hardening at the System Level,” Honolulu, July 2007.
Why Are We So Risk Averse?
• HA, in general, relies on statistical 
inference to quantitatively reduce 
risk.
o Number of samples, number of 
observed events, number/type of 
particles, etc.
• Decisions are often based on a 
combination of test data with 
simulation results, technical 
information, and expert opinion.
• Use “as-is” or remediate?
• Risk aversion tends to be driven by 
the cost/consequences of failure in 
the presence of necessarily 
incomplete information.
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R. Ladbury, et al., “A Bayesian Treatment of Risk for 
Radiation Hardness Assurance,” RADECS Conf., Cap 
D’Agde, France, September 2005.
Costs for:
- Testing (Ct), 
- Remediation (Cr), and
- Failure (Cf).
Two cases:
1) Fly “as-is” when risk is too high
2) Remediate when risk is acceptable
Sources of Radiation Effects 
Uncertainty
• Uncertainty sources are both systematic 
and statistical.
• Effective radiation testing/evaluation 
must address these sources in the failure 
probability.
• For TID and TNID, the main sources of 
statistical uncertainty are lot-to-lot and 
part-to-part variability.
o Traditional mitigation: measure more parts
• For SEE, probabilities scale with rates, 
and rate uncertainties are dominated by 
systematic errors in rate calculation 
methods as well as Poisson fluctuations 
in the observed error counts that 
determine SEE cross sections.
o Traditional mitigation: measure more events
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Effect of temperature on SEE sensitivity
J. R. Schwank, et al., IEEE TNS, 2005.
R. Ladbury, et al., “A Bayesian Treatment of Risk for Radiation Hardness Assurance,” RADECS Conf., Cap D’Agde, France, September 2005.
Latchup in SRAM
Solution Strategies for SEE Risk 
Mitigation
• Maintain existing failure distributions (e.g., Weibull, Lognormal, 
Exponential, etc.) and increase insight using advanced 
techniques such as maximum likelihood (ML).
o For example: R. Ladbury, “Statistical Properties of SEE Rate 
Calculation in the Limits of Large and Small Event Counts,” in IEEE 
TNS, Dec. 2007.
o Potentially solves traditional test method data analysis gaps (e.g., 
JESD57) for small event counts – particularly important for 
destructive events.
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Log likelihood ratios determine not only the best-fit (black square) parameters for the Weibull fit, but also the 
confidence intervals for these parameters, as shown for this slice through the 95% confidence contour.
Solution Strategies for SEE Risk 
Mitigation
• Small number of data points, large parameter spaces, and 
expense of component loss in destructive testing leads to 
conservative approaches – e.g., safe operating areas.
• Develop additional SEE rate calculation approaches for 
destructive effects that better account for and manage risk.
o For example: J. M. Lauenstein, et al., “Interpreting Space-Mission 
LET Requirements for SEGR in Power MOSFETs,” in IEEE TNS, 
2010.
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http://www.irf.com/product-info/hi-rel/reports/gssee_572x0se.pdf
Infineon / International Rectifier
Gen5 MOSFET
Safe Operating Area (SOA)
Solution Strategies for TID/TNID
Risk Mitigation
• RDM for TID and TNID driven by component-level and 
environmental uncertainty as well as program goals.
• Historically, the radiation environment specification (e.g., 
25 krad(Si)) was assumed to be a fixed quantity – driven 
largely by the static AP-8/AE-8 trapped particle models.
o Resulted in integer RDMs, such as 2, 3, 4, etc.
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SPENVIS, http://www.spenvis.oma.be/, v4.6.5
Solution Strategies for TID/TNID
Risk Mitigation
• New AP-9/AE-9 trapped particle models are probabilistic and permit 
full Monte Carlo calculations for evaluating environment dynamics.
o Outputs parameters are similar to solar proton fluence models, though 
derivation process is different.
• For applicable missions, combined environment modeling capability 
allows us to replace RDM with failure probability.
o M. A. Xapsos, et al., “Inclusion of Radiation Environment Variability in Total 
Dose Hardness Assurance Methodology,” in IEEE TNS, in press.
Deliverable to NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program to be published on nepp.nasa.gov. 12
E
nv
iro
nm
en
t V
ar
ia
bi
lit
y
Gamma Ray TID Data on 2N2907 Bipolar Transistor
Future Challenges
• Evaluating space systems with commercial-off-the-shelf 
(COTS) components vs. space systems of COTS components.
• Performing radiation testing/evaluation at various levels of 
component, board, sub-system, and system integration.
o Particle type, energy, flux, etc.
o Component, board, sub-system, system preparation.
• Discovering and quantifying additional mechanisms and/or 
failure modes. Examples include, but are not limited to:
o Destructive failures in Schottky diodes, silicon carbide, gallium 
nitride, etc.
o Proton fission in high-Z packaging materials.
• Coping with test facility bottlenecks for access to both heavy 
ions and protons.
o Facility availability, maintainability, and use cost.
o Increasing user community.
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Acronyms
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Abbreviation Definition
COTS Commercial Off The Shelf
DC Direct current
DDD Displacement damage dose
GEO Geostationary Orbit
HA Hardness assurance
IEEE Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers
LEO Low Earth Orbit
LET Linear Energy Transfer
ML Maximum likelihood
MOSFET Metal Oxide Semiconductor Field Effect Transistor
NEPP NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging program
NESC NASA Engineering and Safety Center
RDM Radiation design margin
SEE Single-event effects
SEGR Single-event gate rupture
SRAM Static random access memory
SOA Safe Operating Area
TID Total ionizing dose
TNID Total non-ionizing dose
TNS Transactions on Nuclear Science
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